NO ONE HAD never dared to think that one day China, where a sublime (and sterilized) Mao still dominates in official iconography, would become a determining element of financial stability for world capitalism: an anchor point for the Asian continent shaken by a monetary crisis, which, after the countries of the Southeast, has also hit Japan, a vaunted island of an economic miracle once considered permanent, timeless, and financial power second only to the United States of America. Observing Tokyo that clings to Beijing is a reality that far exceeds the imagination: the superindustrialised Japan, with a product sixty times greater, relies on China that still belongs to the Third World. Basically it is as if the poor Chinese yuan, a currency that is not yet convertible, helped the Japanese yen, a currency revered for decades on world markets. The imagination comes out humiliated. In this climate, Bill Clinton arrives in China, and is about to set foot on Tienanmen, the scene of the June 1989 massacre. If you put together the two facts, the non-devaluation of the yuan and the first visit of an American president after the repression of nine years ago, Beijing emerges triumphant. More than rehabilitated after the long quarantine for that spilled blood. By offering an image of financial stability and committing not to devalue the yuan, the Chinese regime renders an incalculable service, not only to neighboring Asian countries, but also to America and Europe, because it acts as a barrier to the extreme Eastern crisis. So on the monetary ground at the moment its authoritativeness is undisputed. His invitation to curb the fall of the yen as soon as possible was accepted as an order (if not a threat to be submitted without discussion).
CLINTON has frankly explained why he goes to Beijing, despite numerous opposition at home: when the markets are shaking in Hong Kong or Tokyo, Wall Street feels the shock, and China’s conduct can contribute to stability. His entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has been in question for a long time, would mean the acceptance of some decisive rules of the market economy by a quarter of the planetary population. In addition, Clinton emphasized, in the field of security, Beijing can curb the nuclear arms race, both because it owns it, and because it is able to influence a country like Pakistan today in open and dangerous atomic competition with India. The linear succession to Deng Xiaoping, the regular rise to power of Jiang Zemin, and also the coherent, continuous march towards reforms that increasingly open the country to the market, and of course the ability with which this transition is managed, all these aspects have conferred an undeniable credibility to the Chinese regime. And it is this last, credibility, combined with the need to establish a relationship with a great emerging power, which leads the American president on the Tienanmen, the place where communism has accomplished its “last crime”. A massacre of the end of the century that, spectacularly offered to the eyes of the world, then prevented the bloodshed from being repeated a few months later in Berlin, when the Wall collapsed. Without violence. But the “last crime” has remained unpunished in Beijing: and for many Clinton, as president of the only existing superpower, looking out on the Tiananmen, definitively acquits a regime that continues to violate human rights. Like all the western heads of state that preceded him – from Chirac to Scalfaro – Clinton will invite the landlords to respect those rights. But in the civilization of images, that of the head of the United States on the Beijing square will weigh more than his words. For years China has known the most remarkable growth in the history of modern economy: and in the midst of this unprecedented transformation, it gives an impression of admirable continuity: but its apparent balance is anything but stable in the eyes of many. experts, including Chinese. There is, in short, a side of the coin. Some say the country is poised. According to their analysis, the leaders of Beijing have played all their credibility by committing themselves not to devalue. It was a forced move. The international concertation on the Asian crisis (the G7 meeting in Tokyo), and the consequent intervention of the central banks in favor of the yen, were providential. They should also save the yuan. If this last collapse the entire Chinese reform would suffer a mortal blow, which even the promoters would not miss. Going to Beijing Clinton recognizes the importance of the Chinese role and at the same time reinforces it. Credibility increases. Both sides accept the idea of ​​interdependence that underlies every solid agreement. Chinese isolation crumbles even more. After Mao’s death, it is the economy that drags politics. It is following the road traced by the market that Clinton recovers China. Politics can no longer stop the course. Unless there is a meltdown. Clinton, with his journey, tries to avert this possibility. The Asian crisis has surprised the Chinese economy in the middle of the ford, and in the grip of serious difficulties. The growth rate remains high, but continues to fall: from 8.8% in ’97 to 7.2% in the first quarter ’98: it is therefore dangerously moving away from the 8% on which the entire project is based. government reforms. Moreover, the banking system knows important imbalances: the irrecoverable or doubtful loans, granted above all to the state industry, still dominant and seriously deficient, would represent 20% of the GDP. Added to this is an unstoppable rise in unemployment, which prevents accelerating the privatization of the public sector.
So the progress of the reforms. To define the current Chinese system, an effective neologism is used: “market Leninism”: to indicate that power, through the Communist Party, retains its totalitarian character, but at the same time that the mechanisms of the market are in operation in many sectors, they favor important changes, even in the life of individuals. Private freedoms increase, public freedoms remain prohibited. You can talk badly about Jiang Zemin at home, or between friends, but you can not insult him on the Tienanmen, or criticize him in the newspapers. Who tries there ends up in jail and stays there. The rule of law is not yet Chinese. In the days of Mao, the party even chose your girlfriend. This ambiguous character of “market Leninism” has so far contributed, economically, to preserving the country from the Asian financial crisis. Not yet a convertible currency, the yuan has escaped speculation. The modesty and slowness of the two exchanges in operation (one in Shanghai, the other in Shenzen, with a combined capitalization of 250 billion dollars), have prevented and prevent rapid movements of foreign capital. And therefore of escapes. Add to this the fact that China has taken good care not to contract short-term loans with foreign banks, as did neighboring countries, which then became entangled in unsustainable maturities at the time of the crisis. The most distressing example, which is often used, is that of Suharto ‘s Indonesia. Forcing the hand a little, there are indeed those who see not a few similarities between the “new order” that allowed Jakarta a very rapid economic expansion and “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, otherwise called “market Leninism”. Two effective and authoritative formulas. The unresolved question of responsibility for the Tiananmen massacre is like a worm in Chinese society: in the event of a crisis, under popular pressure, it could be dusted off. And, as happened in Jakarta, not a few executives still in service in Beijing could be indicted. Li Peng, the former prime minister, who will be in the front row to receive Clinton, could, for example, be accused of declaring martial law in June 89. Henry Kissinger argues that China should not be seen through the prism of past, but rather with the aim of saving its stability and recovering it. Clinton shares this idea. So he is in Beijing, and he will go to the Tienanmen.